essential to Atheism, to make senseless matter the sole original of all things, and consequently to suppose all conscious intellectual beings to be made or generated. Wherefore they, who, on the contrary, assert (not one but) many understating beings unmade and self-existent, must needs be looked upon as those who, of the two, approach nearer to Theism than to Atheism, and so deserve rather to be called Polytheists than Atheists.

And there is no question to be made, but that the urgers of the forementioned objection against that idea of God, which includes oneliness and singularity in it, from the Pagan Polytheism, or ntaltiplicity of gods, take it for granted, that this is to be understood of many unmade self-existent deities, independent upon one Supreme, that are so many first principles in the universe, and partial causes *gf* the world. And certainly, if it could be made to appear, that the Pagan Polytheists did universally acknowledge such a multiplicity of unmade, self-existent deities, then the argument fetched from thence, against the natu-rality of that idea of God proposed (essentially including singularity in it), might seem to have no small force or validity in it.

xtt. But, first, this opinion of many self-existent deities, independent upon one Supreme, is both very irrational in itself, and also plainly repugnant to the phenomena. We say, first, it is irrational in itself, because self-existence and necessary existence being essential to a perfect being, and.to nothing else, it must needs be very irrational and absurd to suppose a multitude of imprerfect understanding beings self-existent, and no perfect one. Moreover, if imperfect under-